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INTRODUCTION
When I first taught Statutory Analysis: Criminal Law, almost ten years ago, it
was not just a new class for me. It was also a new course for the new curriculum of
our new law school. The class had been taught only once before: to our inaugural
class of students. Statutory Analysis was ambitious in its goals, seeking to cover the
same core concepts and basic crimes as a criminal law class—like the one I had
taken about fifteen years earlier—and to introduce students to techniques of
statutory interpretation.1 Not only was I to teach students the elements of crime in
the abstract and the definitions of specific crimes, I was also to teach them how to
develop their own arguments about what the words in criminal statutes should mean
in the context of a case. The idea was to equip students with the tools to analyze
any provision of law and to begin to construct an argument about how it should be
interpreted.
*Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine. The author is grateful to Rachel Croskery-Roberts,
Alexandra Natapoff, and Ken Simons, who provided critical suggestions and commentary on an early
version of this essay, and to the careful and thoughtful students who edited this essay for the Law
Review.
1. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Statutory Analysis: Using Criminal Law to Highlight Issues in
Statutory Interpretation, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 131, 137 (2011).
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Achieving this goal would necessarily take into account students’ background,
their experiences as well as their expectations, so that the class design and materials
met them where they were. Because our students came from all over and from all
manner of undergraduate institutions, this first semester was particularly
educational for me as much as for the students: they taught me what they needed
and what they wanted, which were not always the same thing. At the same time,
Statutory Analysis formed part of the first-year curriculum at this new law school
that sought to meet multiple sets of lofty expectations: excelling under conventional
and longstanding measures of excellence, satisfying demands for innovation often
predicated on criticism of those same criteria, and making students’ sizeable
financial investment worthwhile. This last goal was critical to the long-term
financial well-being of the University of California, Irvine School of Law (“Law
School”).
Teaching, in short, required multiple levels of situational awareness,
encompassing the subject matter to be taught, the diversity of the students in the
classroom, and the implications of the financial model of legal education. It was a
lot.
As I developed the syllabus, revising a version of one used by Professor
Jennifer M. Chacón, who had taught the class that first year, I kept thinking of
exercises for the students. I could ask them to draft a statute, so that they could see
the difficulty of writing the law in such a way that it produces desirable outcomes
consistently when applied to different sets of facts. I could ask them to prepare
arguments for the defense or the prosecution on how a provision of the California
Penal Code should be interpreted. Eventually I would use these exercises and
others, unlike anything I experienced in my criminal law class. However, my
methods of assessment, a midterm and a final examination, would likely have been
familiar at any law school in the country, and this nagged at me. Before I started
teaching law, I briefly served as the director of academic skills at the Law School.
In that role, I explored the broad literature on, and often critical of, traditional law
school pedagogy. Meetings with students also reminded me of the ways in which
legal education is challenging and of questions I’d asked as a law student myself,
about why certain subjects were taught and tested in certain ways. I wanted to bring
the lessons of those meetings to bear in class, to try to demystify and to clarify.
Yet law school is also challenging, even mysterious, by design. Socratic
dialogue aims to develop in students the ability to recognize and analyze issues; the
questions put by the professor should help the student to understand what matters
to a lawyer and why. This is not the most effective way to reach all students, and
research on effective teaching has suggested a number of different approaches that
are more likely to work well with a diverse classroom population.2 Group exercises

2. Paula Lustbader, Teach in Context: Responding to Diverse Student Voices Helps All Students
Learn, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 402, 404 (1998) (“To reduce alienation and enhance learning for all students,
law schools must create a culture and climate in which diverse students can flourish. That means
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and more frequent, low-stakes assessments, which are not always used in law
schools, are more effective tools; lecturing, which is still frequently used in law
teaching, is a less effective tool.3 This was another example of tension between
innovation and convention, relating not just to what was taught but how it was
taught. Such tension was evident throughout my first semester of Statutory
Analysis. And when I later read the essay about the founding of the Law School by
our first dean, Erwin Chemerinsky, I recognized that it was a tension confronting
the Law School as a whole. Dean Chemerinsky wrote the following about the early
days of law faculty debates over the curriculum: “Our central challenge was to be
sufficiently traditional to be credible, but sufficiently innovative to justify why we
exist.”4
Deliberately, then, UCI Law settled on the brink, straddling convention and
innovation. The founding faculty considered what they thought a law school should
offer, picking and choosing from models offered by other institutions and
sometimes adopting them, other times modifying them or abandoning them
outright. The challenge of maintaining what is good about legal education and
jettisoning what is not is not itself new.5 Legal scholars have criticized legal
education for a variety of reasons, including for instituting changes, for as long as
there have been law schools.6 And law schools have engaged in overhaul of their
curricula before, though it is likely that a time-traveling law student from a century
or more in the past would recognize most of the courses on offer today, especially
in the first year program. It is newsworthy when law schools make any changes;
legal education in a common law nation that fundamentally prizes adherence to the
past is understandably slow to change and may be loath to deviate from the wellestablished and successful format dictated by tradition.

increasing the diversity of the students, staff, and faculty, and modifying both curriculum and pedagogy
to provide greater context.”).
3. See Paula Lustbader, Good Practice Respects Diverse Talents and Ways of Learning, 49 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 448, 450 (1999) (“Teachers can foster a more effective classroom climate if they treat students
with respect; combine the Socratic method with other teaching methods, especially cooperative learning
exercises; incorporate different experiences that allow students to display their knowledge in a variety
of ways; state their expectations explicitly; give students written questions and hypothetical problems
before class; teach students to prepare for class; and evaluate student performance in a variety of
ways.”).
4. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Ideal Law School for the 21st Century, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 17
(2011); see also Bryant G. Garth, Having it Both Ways. The Challenge of Legal Education Innovation and
Reform at UCI and Elsewhere: Against the Grain and/or Aspiring to Be Elite, 10 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 373 (2020).
5. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Harvard Law Decides to Steep Students in 21st-Century Issues,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2006, at A10 (describing Harvard’s “broadest overhaul in more than 100 years” to
its law curriculum); see also Jonathan D. Glater, Training Law Students for Real-Life Careers, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 31, 2007, at B9 (surveying changes at several law schools in response to concerns that legal
education does not prepare law students for law practice).
6. See Bryant G. Garth, Crises, Crisis Rhetoric, and Competition in Legal Education: A Sociological
Perspective on the (Latest) Crisis of the Legal Profession and Legal Education, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 503, 507 (2013) (describing attacks on legal education and the legal profession in the 1930s).
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When this law school launched, there were good reasons to be cautious. The
lingering effects of the financial crisis, which began in fall 2008 and led to the worst
contraction since the Great Depression, prompted questions about who would want
to go to law school and whether anyone who went would get a job. At the same
time, legal education was beset by a public image crisis, as a series of articles in The
New York Times,7 law review articles,8 and entire books9 fired broadsides against
law schools. Critics questioned the need for as many law schools as the nation had
and, consequently, the particular need for a new one in the University of California
system. Critics questioned the tuition charged, raised concerns about graduates’
earnings, and warned that students were not ready for practice because the law
school curriculum had not kept pace with the changing needs of the profession.10
All in all, this was not an auspicious moment for a new law school, and the
somewhat unfocused miasma of criticism, however inapplicable or misguided,11
hovered even over my thinking about course design and coverage.
UCI Law has been successful; in the fall of 2018, the institution welcomed its
largest first-year class ever. Indeed, it was a class nearly 50% larger than intended,
as we attracted more students than anticipated. This is a reflection of outside
recognition of what the Law School offers, as well as high placement in rankings.
UCI Law was a player. By such measures, the Law School has achieved one of its
goals: we are elite. This progress should be vindication and also liberation, creating
space for the pursuit of creative, novel law teaching as our founding dean described.
Of course, as long as the accolades continue, perhaps no one will ask about
innovation.
When I walk into the classroom to teach Statutory Analysis now, nearly ten
years later, I am still very focused on the need for balance between innovation and
satisfying the expectations of students and others out there evaluating me and us. I
still worry about the concrete effects of the cost of legal education on our students
and the importance of justifying that cost. In short, I still have that sense of
7.
See, e.g., David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, at BU1.
8.
See, e.g., Paul Campos, The Crisis of the American Law School, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 177
(2012).
9.
See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012).
10. Id. at 182–83. Members of UCI Law’s founding faculty knew of these criticisms and certainly
had them in mind when designing this institution’s curriculum. See, e.g., Ann Southworth & Catherine
L. Fisk, Our Institutional Commitment to Teach About the Legal Profession, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 73, 73
(2011) (describing the goal of the founding faculty “to create a first-year curriculum that captures the
latest wisdom about what knowledge, skills, and values law schools should impart to their students”).
11. There were, of course, critical responses to law schools’ critics. See, e.g., Lucille A. Jewel,
Tales of a Fourth Tier Nothing, A Response to Brian Tamanaha’s Failing Law Schools, 38 J. LEGAL
PROF. 125 (2013); Michael A. Olivas, Ask Not for Whom the Law School Bell Tolls: Professor Tamanaha,
Failing Law Schools, and (Mis)Diagnosing the Problem, 41 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 101 (2013). While legal
education has undergone consolidation, with a few institutions closing their doors, Sonali Kohli,
Rosanna Xia & Teresa Watanabe, Whittier Law School Is Closing, Due in Part to Low Student
Achievement, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2017), at https://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-eduwhittier-law-school-closing-20170420-story.html [ https://perma.cc/R2N2-WQRL ], the basic model
has not changed significantly at the vast majority of schools.
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performing a balancing act, of walking along a tightrope. But I have come to believe
that the prospect of constant change, along with the absence of complacency, and
a readiness to continue to question what we do and how we do it, are core attributes
of UCI Law.
Statutory Analysis, like the other classes that make up the first-year curriculum
at the Law School, is a microcosm of the institution as a whole. In designing our
courses, in drafting and modifying the syllabi, we, professors, must resolve the same
questions that the founding faculty faced and find a way to balance comfortably the
same competing goals that they pursued. Of course, each of us does this differently,
spending more or less time on specific topics and skills, incorporating different
kinds of exercises and assessments more or less often. This Essay is animated by
the conviction that sharing an explanation of Statutory Analysis will aid in turn in
explanation and analysis of the Law School as an institution, both its singular
achievements and its ongoing challenges.
Accordingly, the discussion that follows will begin with the course, then step
back to consider the opportunity and challenge posed by the population of students
who take it, and then step back further to consider the critical challenge of cost,
which confronts legal education more generally. These three areas I anticipate will
continue to be in flux as the Law School moves into its second decade. In the first
Part, I will describe the development of teaching methods I have used in Statutory
Analysis over time and possible changes I anticipate in the future, building on the
substantive explanation of the course provided by Professor Chacón, who helped
create the class. The second Part steps back to address the importance of effectively
teaching and otherwise supporting our increasingly diverse and sophisticated
students, many of whom arrive having undergone life-changing experiences already
and many of whom have well-formed, normative beliefs about the nature of
injustice and about the uses to which law should be put. Part III turns to the
financing of legal education, an area I have written about in other contexts, and a
challenge confronting all law schools. A brief conclusion follows.
I. PEDAGOGY AND STATUTORY ANALYSIS
In designing Statutory Analysis, those of us who teach it face three basic
challenges. First, the class should help introduce first-year students to the methods
and purposes of legal education and, ideally, relate those methods and purposes to
the practice of law. This challenge is itself one consequence of the Law School’s
innovative curriculum, in that many institutions do not require students to take
criminal law in the first semester of the first year; I took the class in my third year.
Second, it should introduce students to basic tools of statutory interpretation. Third,
it should introduce students to core concepts of criminal law and to the elements
of a specific set of crimes (typically including at least homicide, sexual assault, theft,
attempt, and conspiracy) and defenses (justifications, like self-defense, and excuses,
like mistake). There is currently no criminal law casebook that attempts to achieve
all three of these goals and as a result, the class uses a supplemental reading packet
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that includes nearly all the cases and background readings related to statutory
construction. Over the years, I have also included in this supplement optional
readings to help students with more difficult issues that arise in the class, including
provisions of the California Penal Code and the state’s model jury instructions.
Students seem to appreciate reading real-world documents that provide the basis of
judges’ instructions to juries. I have advised students to consult these additional
sources if they are not satisfied with a judicial opinion’s explanation or definition.
After all, the model jury instructions represent a group effort to distill and convey
the elements of crimes for a lay audience of jurors, and this can be very helpful for
students working both to learn to identify elements of crimes generally and elements
of specific crimes.
A. Teaching Goals
A more traditional criminal law class might begin with explicit discussion of
theories of punishment that explain why we criminalize what we do, or else
identification of the core elements of crime—an evil act that causes harm, an evil
thought animating the evil act, and the proper relationship in time and place
between the act and the intent. But this class approaches these topics somewhat
obliquely because in the first weeks, we focus on statutory construction, on theories
of interpretation, and the different sources of meaning that each prioritizes. These
interpretive theories, rules, and practices may reflect and reinforce ideas about
punishment.
All but one of the judicial opinions assigned for this first month or so of the
class resolve criminal cases, but the crimes at issue are not selected because they are
likely to be tested on the bar examination or otherwise have special, substantive
significance in criminal law doctrine. This is one of the most challenging aspects of
the class, in part because in other first-semester courses, students are learning to
pull the definition—the answer—from the opinion. At this stage of this course, the
conclusion the court reaches is far less important than the path that the court took
to reach that answer. It is of no moment whether students remember, for example,
the definition of the defense to perjury provided in 18 U.S.C. §1623(d),12 but the
reasoning of the court in determining that definition matters greatly.

12. “Where, in the same continuous court or grand jury proceeding in which a declaration is
made, the person making the declaration admits such declaration to be false, such admission shall bar
prosecution under this section if, at the time the admission is made, the declaration has not substantially
affected the proceeding, or it has not become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed.”
United States v. Sherman, 150 F.3d 306, 311 (1998). The provision is at issue in a case that is sometimes
assigned in Statutory Analysis in which the defendant is charged with perjury and essentially argues that
although it had “become manifest that such falsity . . . [had been] exposed,” he should still be able to
use the recantation defense because the falsehood had “not substantially affected the proceeding.”
Id. at 313. The appellate court concluded that in this provision, the word “or” should be read as “and.”
Id. at 317.
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B. Substance: Perspectives on Legal Doctrine
Through the five or six statutory interpretation cases in the first three weeks
of the class, students are exposed to canons of construction, such as the “plain
meaning” rule; substantive rules, such as the rule of lenity; the role of legislative
history; and finally, to constitutional constraints on potential meanings of statutes.
This last subject provides the bridge from the packet of supplementary materials to
the casebook that I use, Criminal Law Cases and Materials by Cynthia Lee and Angela
P. Harris (hereinafter “Lee & Harris”), which has a section on the limitations placed
on criminal law by the due process requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments; the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment; and the prohibition on discrimination in the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.13
Every year I weigh whether to include one civil case in the course supplement,
and every year I end up deciding it is worthwhile. The case introduces to students
the concept of “Chevron deference,” the deference of courts to executive agencies’
reasonable interpretations of statutes.14 I consider this sufficiently important that it
merits a detour from criminal cases. Nearly every year that I have taught Statutory
Analysis, at least one student from the prior year’s class has told me that at her or
his summer job, no one else had already been exposed to the concept of Chevron
deference. Invariably, the student’s knowledge proved useful. In light of this, I
anticipate that I will continue to include the case.
Although the casebook I use does not include extensive discussion of statutory
interpretation, it does make significant use of secondary materials that complement
and provide various perspectives on the issues in the judicial opinions. Excerpts of
essays addressing bias, either on the part of particular actors in the criminal law
enforcement regime or in the substance of law itself, serve a number of important
course goals. For those students who arrive with critical concerns about the criminal
law, some of these materials offer some vindication: they are not alone in their
concerns. For students who do not, these materials may open their eyes to ways in
which law is deeply contextual, reflecting beliefs and values of particular people at
a particular time.
The ways in which context can change and views evolve become especially
apparent when we discuss sexual assault, an area in which the law has evolved over
the past few decades.15 For those students who arrive viewing law as a neutral,
objective, even natural, ordering force, these materials should help them to
appreciate different perspectives that view law as an instrument of power that may
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”).
14. Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003).
15. See CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA P. HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW CASES & MATERIALS 432
(3d ed. 2014) [hereinafter LEE & HARRIS].
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protect the interests of the privileged and undermine those of the marginal. For
example, in our discussion of the risk of discriminatory enforcement of laws that
are too loosely written or too “vague,” an excerpt of an essay by Paul Butler should
make vivid the frustrating experience of unwanted police attention on the basis of
race.16 I do not expect that at the end of the semester every student will have
adopted any particular perspective—and indeed, not all of the scholars whose views
we discuss agree with each other—but I do expect that the students will understand
various critiques.
C. Teaching Methods
Inclusion of varied perspectives on law is only one tactic, albeit a very
important one, for educating law students to be the empathetic and perceptive
advocates I hope they will become. The class also should use diverse teaching
methods to help these students to learn; imparting knowledge using the format of
the stand-up lecture in which the professor speaks and students listen is not always
the most effective. Education scholars have found many other, often more effective
tools that promote understanding and the ability to use new information. Group
exercises,17 flipped classrooms,18 and other relatively19 innovative practices can both
reduce the stress level in a law school classroom and improve students’
understanding and retention.20 Adopting these methods and adapting them to legal
education are broader challenges confronting law schools.21
In an effort to make it easier for students to focus on the reasoning process, I
have used different techniques, aimed at different kinds of learners. Typically for at
least one of the early cases, we develop a graphical representation of the reasoning,
and the students help me draft a flow chart on the classroom’s whiteboard. We do
this for both the majority opinion and the dissent, which enables us to match up
the arguments against each other visually and have a group discussion of which
arguments in each opinion are more or less persuasive, and why. We also list the
16. See generally Paul Butler, Walking While Black: Encounters with the Police on My Street, LEGAL
TIMES, Nov. 10, 1997, at 23, as excerpted in LEE & HARRIS, supra note 15, at 86–91.
17. Lustbader, supra note 2, at 409.
18. Anne E. Mullins, The Flipped Classroom: Fad or Innovation?, 92 OR. L. REV. ONLINE 27,
27–28 (describing the virtues of flipped classrooms appreciated by legal writing faculty for years).
19. For law schools, that is. Many of my students have already experienced these methods in
the course of their undergraduate and high school educations.
20. Lustbader, supra note 2, at 408 (providing a safe space for students to discuss concepts
covered can help students develop methods to cope with stress); see also Lustbader, supra note 3, at 450
(“To create a more effective learning climate, law schools could adopt a pedagogy that connects content
to student experience, incorporates students’ values, and promotes collaboration.”).
21. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 4, 9 (2007), http:/
/archive.carnegiefoundation.org/pdfs/elibrary/elibrary_pdf_632.pdf [ https://perma.cc/6Q5YLWT2 ] (“Although the ways of teaching appropriate to develop professional identity and purpose range
from classroom didactics to reflective practice in clinical situations, the key challenge in supporting
students’ ethical-social development is to keep each of these emphases in active communication with
each other.”).

First to Printer_Glater (Do Not Delete)

2020]

STATUTORY ANALYSIS

1/17/2020 10:33 AM

409

tools of statutory construction used to support each argument, to help the students
see that sometimes courts rely on canons of construction implicitly. This process
helps students to appreciate the choices that will be available to them as advocates
about what to focus on first in making an argument about statutory
meaning: perhaps the text, the intent, the purpose, the consequences.
The other technique that I present to the students is making a reverse outline
of the opinion, distilling each paragraph to a phrase and so building a concise
representation of the reasoning on a single sheet of paper. Students can use the
distillation both to help remember the case generally and also to see at once all the
steps in the reasoning of the judge(s). With a short case, like the one touching on
Chevron deference, I will ask the class to take a few minutes to attempt this, then
solicit volunteers to read out the phrases that they came up with to summarize each
paragraph or group of paragraphs in the opinion. This approach has an added
benefit: it reaches students who might be uncomfortable being cold-called in class,
because this exercise gives students time to prepare their responses on paper or on
screen, and they simply have to read and perhaps explain them. I will return to the
issue of cold-calling below.
Every time I teach Statutory Analysis, I try to incorporate more innovative
tactics, often after consultation with colleagues who have studied pedagogy, both in
the Law School and in the larger university. And every time that I teach the class, I
try to reduce the anxiety provoked by cold-calling, both by specifying beforehand a
core set of questions I will always ask and spending less time questioning any one
student. In the future I am debating shifting away from the most demanding form
of cold-calling by instead requiring students to sign up to be on call for a certain
number of class sessions, so that at least they have some agency in the process. My
aim is to lower their levels of anxiety.
Group assignments would also reduce student stress, I am sure, because using
groups would mean that students would not be alone in responding to questions.
Yet group assignments, especially in a large, first-year class, create some risks. First,
students know that they are graded on a hard curve and so may not want the poor
performance of a classmate to affect their grade. Second, based on casual
conversations with students over the years, I have concluded that they arrive at the
Law School with certain expectations, and one of them is that they will be assessed
individually. Third, to the extent that not all members of the faculty use group work,
those professors who do run the risk of suffering student criticism on end-of-term
evaluations. In other words, innovation may earn punishment. These hurdles make
clear the extent to which pedagogy is tied up with institutional culture and
expectations, which in turn are shaped by methods of faculty evaluation, a subject
to which I return below.22
The complex and multifaceted challenge of improving pedagogy clearly
cannot be a reason for avoiding it. Each of those challenges can be addressed.
22.

See infra Part II.
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Indeed, the American Bar Association increasingly is demanding that law schools
take this task on by, for example, developing learning objectives at the level of the
institution and the individual class.23 Increasingly, technology offers means of
helping students to consolidate their learning outside the classroom, enabling
low-stakes quizzes, podcasts, interactive exercises, and other tools. It takes time to
incorporate these methods of engagement into a class. Furthermore, how they are
presented matters, because students may not appreciate a syllabus that seems simply
to add more work for them. So, in Statutory Analysis I strive for transparency in
teaching to help students understand why they are being asked to do the work
assigned. Over the course of the semester, I also address stress explicitly and suggest
management tricks that they can use when taking tests.
Making transparency a priority reflects my conviction that the best way to
prepare our students for practice is not to simulate its most difficult and stressful
moments in the hope that they will build up some kind of mental calluses that will
protect them. When we observe a video recording of a Ninth Circuit oral argument
that led to a judicial opinion that students have read, the students can appreciate
what the lawyers had to do to prepare. We discuss how difficult the task is and we
share ideas on how best to manage stress. These discussions matter because
although law school can cause anxiety, causing anxiety makes students anxious but
does not necessarily enable students to cope more easily with stress in the future.
When the class turns to reading judicial opinions to learn substantive criminal
law, after focusing on techniques of interpretation, I try to point out those moments
in decisions we are reading to learn substantive criminal law when judges are using
canons of construction that students should know. Ideally, the judicial opinions
unpacking the law of homicide, sexual assault, and other crimes will also help
students to recall and to see how to apply all the tools covered in the first weeks of
the semester. The efficacy of this pedagogy is something that I continuously think
about; the class evolves every year.
Beyond effective presentation of the substance of the law and methods of
interpretation, in Statutory Analysis I also try to help students see the essential role
of discretion in criminal law enforcement—and the risks that such discretion
necessarily creates. Usually this comes up when the class discusses drafting a statute
and I offer a series of hypothetical situations that, were the statute applied precisely
as written, would lead to outcomes that students do not desire. For example, one
year, students prepared a prohibition on jaywalking, and I asked the drafters whether
it would be enforced against a person who rushes to save a stroller that has rolled
into the middle of a busy street. Of course, they said no. But they quickly also saw
23. STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCH., Standard 302
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2018-2019), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/
legal_education/Standards/2018-2019ABAStandardsforApprovalofLawSchools/2018-2019-abastandards-chapter3.pdf [ https://perma.cc/AAG3-ZH2K ].
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that redrafting to address every eventuality ahead of time would be impossible.
Adopting rules of interpretation and allowing for some discretion in enforcement
attempt to deal with this problem.
A good casebook will juxtapose appellate opinions describing either (a) different
facts but reaching the same outcome, or (b) nearly identical facts but different
outcomes. These contrasts open up space for conversations about what drives
courts to view different fact patterns as sufficiently similar to justify the same
application of law, and what drives courts to view similar fact patterns as sufficiently
distinct to justify different applications of the law. Much can turn on the ways in
which facts are similar and ways in which they differ. The law also can differ in
different jurisdictions, provoking conversations about why one state defines a crime
in one way and another in a different way.
One of the troubling cases that we read in Statutory Analysis, People v. Berry,24
describes a man who waits in his wife’s empty apartment for approximately twenty
hours and, when she arrives, strangles her.25 We read the case in part to understand
the differences between first degree and second degree murder: one possible reason
to convict a defendant of first degree murder is if prior to the killing, the defendant
was “lying in wait,” which suggests that the defendant had made a plan, or acted in
a “willful, deliberate, and premeditated” manner.26 The reviewing court concluded
that on the facts, the jury should have been given the opportunity to convict the
defendant of voluntary manslaughter for committing a killing that was provoked.
Voluntary manslaughter would be a lesser charge than either first- or second-degree
murder. The state Supreme Court’s opinion forces the class to grapple with the
reasons the justices thought that the defendant’s conduct might have been
provoked, notwithstanding a course of conduct that certainly looked like lying in
wait.
When we discuss how and why the California Supreme Court reached the
conclusion that it did, we invariably also talk about the justices’ apparent view of
domestic violence, in particular violence against women. This in turn invites
discussion of how the law, as interpreted by judges who are still disproportionately
men, treats the interests of women. Bringing these critical perspectives into the
classroom may rile some students; what evidence there is of sexism in the Berry
opinion is subtle and indirect.27 Yet ignoring the question of the law’s differential
interpretation and application for people historically excluded from power,
including the power to draft and interpret laws, would and should also rile students.

24. See People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976).
25. Id. at 778–79. There are more facts than this abbreviated description provides, but they are
not relevant to the point of this Article.
26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189.
27. For example, the opinion refers to the victim, a twenty-year-old woman, as a “girl.” Berry,
556 P.2d at 778.
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Our discussion of Berry challenges the presumption that the law as written, as
handed down, and as applied is somehow neutral and objective.28
Not only do I hope that students appreciate the difficulty of law functioning
perfectly because of the myriad, unpredictable factual situations to which it will be
applied, but I also hope that they will understand diverse analytical perspectives,
some of which emphasize the unequal division of power between those legislating
and interpreting the law, and those subject to it. As Professor Amna Akbar put it,
[W]e must have the courage to investigate law’s relationship to race,
gender, sex, and capitalism through inquiries grounded in our now and our
past. We must study the dialectic between social structures, ideologies, and
political commitments that motivate and constitute the law. We must
uncover law’s assumptions and ask if they are fair to make.29
Meeting this challenge requires giving up on an idealized notion of law that
consistently conflates legislation and justice. Students should appreciate that laws
are the products of particular historical moments and the values shared among the
law-making community in those moments. To the extent that students share those
animating values, they will likely be more willing to endorse the laws. Thus, one
project of the class is to make those values, which may be assumed and go unstated
by those who draft legislation and by judges who interpret it, explicit. Then students
can decide and discuss whether they share them or not.
The ways in which shared beliefs affect the drafting of legislation probably
belongs in a separate class on that subject. The details of the legislative process are
beyond the scope of Statutory Analysis. But given the attempt to contextualize
criminal law, I find leaving out the legislative process frustrating. A question to
grapple with, perhaps over the next decade in the life of the Law School, is whether
a full course on legislation should be added to the first-year curriculum, thus
resolving the tension between coverage of substantive criminal law and presentation
of statutory analysis. As conceived and as taught, Statutory Analysis represents a
compromise intended to give students basic tools that they can use across the
curriculum and across practice areas, while retaining coverage of the substantive
doctrine that lawyers traditionally have learned. Whether the current formulation is
the optimal balancing of these goals remains an open question.
It is important to ensure that discussions throughout the class go beyond the
text, if I may analogize to statutory interpretation. We should take into account
social and historical context. For example, the class discussion of theories of
punishment—which comes later in the class than it likely would, were this a more
typical criminal law class—must extend beyond essential, but abstract, justifications

28. See, e.g., Amna A. Akbar, Law’s Exposure: The Movement and the Legal Academy, 65 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 352, 368 (2015) (“[D]ecisions about what or how we teach are not neutral, objective, or
apolitical.”). Professor Akbar’s essay is only a recent example and in her work she cites to many others,
dating back decades. Id. at 367 n.63.
29. Id. at 367.
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including deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.30 There are now
numerous scholars who have argued that study of how criminal law is actually
enforced and against whom will suggest very different theories. Critical scholars
have noted that crime can justify invasive government regulation of institutions
from schools to the workplace.31 Others have argued that how criminal law is
enforced, where it is enforced, and against whom it is enforced all subject particular
segments of the population to greater social control—and that this is no accident.32
This perspective is not confined to the academy; for years now, some students have
arrived familiar with the analogy encapsulated in the title of Professor Michelle
Alexander’s book, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness.33
These students are eager to study and talk about the ways in which law can produce,
enforce, and reproduce social hierarchy.
The more varied the experiences and perspectives students bring with them
into the classroom and share with their classmates, the more diverse their points of
view are and the more diverse the demands they make of a class on criminal law.
Fortunately, student diversity also makes it easier to identify and discuss multiple
perspectives both on methods of interpretation and on criminal law. As the next
Part details, students are indeed bringing more varied experiences and perspectives
into the Law School.
II. A DYNAMIC STUDENT POPULATION: THE DEMANDS OF DIVERSITY
This Part flips the classroom to focus on the students and so see more of the
ways in which this one course is representative of the larger institution. The diversity
of the student body at the Law School creates a welcome opportunity in the
Statutory Analysis course to explore both statutory construction and substantive
criminal law with fresh eyes. Students bring experiences from all over the country,
although most continue to come from California. Of course, even within California,
there is incredible diversity. Some of my students have direct experience with
criminal law enforcement, others have already spent time working with people who
are affected by it. In the fall of 2018, when I was asked to write this Essay, nearly
half of the students in the first year class were people of color.34 This has been the
30.
31.

See LEE & HARRIS, supra note 15, at 11.
See, e.g., JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 4 (2007) (describing
how the state may use the “category of crime to legitimate interventions that have other motivations,”
such as enabling state imposition of punishment in pursuit of political gain).
32. See, e.g., Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed To: The Limits of Criminal
Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1425 (2016) (arguing that “many of the problems identified by
critics [of criminal law enforcement in the United States] are not actually problems, but are instead
integral features of policing and punishment in the United States. They are how the system is supposed
to work.”).
33. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (rev. ed. 2012).
34. To be precise, 44.5 percent (102 out of 229). U.C. IRVINE SCH. OF LAW, STANDARD 509
INFORMATION REPORT (2018), https://www.law.uci.edu/about/consumer-info/Std509Report.pdf
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case for a couple of years now. The class includes students who attended large, often
public universities and who as undergraduates may not have received extensive
individualized feedback on their work in small classes. It includes students who
majored in a very broad range of fields, some of whom have had to complete
extensive writing projects and others who have not. Some students are children of
lawyers and are very savvy about law school, while others are the first in their
families to go to law school, or perhaps to have completed college, and are not sure
at all what to expect when they walk into that first class.
Students arrive with distinct learning experiences and learning styles. Some of
them have thought about how they most effectively absorb information and others
have not. One of the important goals of the class extends beyond the subject matter
of criminal law to encompass figuring this out. For this reason, I encourage students
to experiment with different techniques, from the research-based recommendation
that they forego using a laptop to take notes35 to reading their notes aloud into their
phones and then listening to the audio to reinforce their recollection. I also
encourage them to keep track of the different tactics they use and to consider what
seems to work best for them. When they move on to the practice of law, they will
be well-served if they have already learned how they best absorb new information.
What are the implications of welcoming such a diverse and increasingly
sophisticated and demanding student population, and in an increasingly and openly
combative political environment? Certainly, members of the faculty face
considerable likelihood of disagreement over fundamental issues in their
classrooms, such as the impact and proper role of government in society and the
extent to which identity characteristics like race, gender, and class shape or limit
opportunity, to name only two sets of hot-button issues. Many students are also
very aware of their own identities and, consequently, are attentive to perceived
attacks on aspects of those identities in the form of statements heard as racist,
xenophobic, homophobic, sexist, misogynist, classist, or just clueless. This is a
recipe for tension and conflict within the classroom, certainly in courses that, like
Statutory Analysis, invite discussion of inequity in the law, but also in classes that
may seem far removed from such controversy. For example, in Business
Associations, a class that I also teach, it would be difficult to avoid discussion of
the financial crisis that preceded the Great Recession and the racially disparate
effects of home lending and subsequent foreclosure. Socioeconomic inequality in
[ https://perma.cc/7DBX-S8D7 ]. This calculation excludes nonresident alien students and students
who declined to provide demographic information, and defines a person of color as a person who
indicated that s/he was not white or a person who indicated that s/he belonged to two or more races,
one of which was not white. Fall 2018 Incoming J.D. Class Profile, U.C. IRVINE SCH. L., https://
www.law.uci.edu/admission/class-profile.html [ https://perma.cc/3JXS-HJYE ] ( last updated Oct. 5,
2018 ).
35. There are too many sources on this now to cite but the one that I share with students
showed that students who did not use laptops to take notes performed better on assessments. See Pam
A. Mueller & Daniel M. Oppenheimer, The Pen Is Mightier Than the Keyboard: Advantages of Longhand
Over Laptop Note Taking, 25 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1159, 1166 (2014).
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general and along lines of race in particular thus become part of the discussion
ostensibly focused on the costs and benefits of the publicly traded, corporate form.
One reason for greater tension in the classroom is greater tension in the
national, political culture. With the election of 2016, political leaders have made or
embraced statements associated with racist, xenophobic, nationalistic worldviews.36
Not surprisingly, both on- and off-campus, young people who share those views
are more comfortable expressing them. At the same time the ubiquity of mobile
phones equipped with cameras and the diffuse reach of social media have meant
that those offensive statements can find their way to the national stage, embroiling
members of a college fraternity in controversy after video surfaced of their
enthusiastic rendition of an openly racist song, for example.37 Whether our politics
and culture are more polarized than a decade before, I cannot say, but it does seem
clear that the costs of expressing views previously viewed as extreme have fallen.38
These developments put two significant pressures on us as teachers. First, we
must be ready to have difficult conversations about potentially controversial topics.
In many cases, we should probably start those conversations ourselves, and we
should come prepared with facts that our students want or need. But substantive
preparation will not be enough on its own. In addition, we must be ready for student
discomfort and vociferous disagreement. Given the lack of formal training of most
law professors in teaching, this may be a challenge. In part for this reason, faculty
at UCI Law regularly discuss classroom dynamics and we have held workshops on
managing difficult discussions because high quality pedagogy is a priority here.
Members of the faculty value teaching highly, and in part for this reason, students
sit in on presentations by potential hires and share their views of candidates’
teaching ability.
Attention to teaching is important in this polarized moment. In the past, law
professors may have learned on the job—from teaching—how to improve our
methods and promote student understanding. In the past, the costs of this
traditional approach to training of teachers might have been modest. But most of
us likely have not had the experience of trying to manage a classroom in which one
student’s uninformed comment has led to an accusation of offensive insensitivity
that has in turn set the room on a knife’s edge. The costs of handling that moment
badly can be considerable. Students who view themselves as vulnerable will look to

36. See, e.g., Trip Gabriel, Steve King’s White Supremacy Remark Is Rebuked by Iowa’s Republican
Senators, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2019, at A14 (reporting on fallout from remarks by Iowa Republican
congressman Steve King, who in a prior interview “said at one point: ‘White nationalist, white
supremacist, Western civilization — how did that language become offensive?’”).
37. See Manny Fernandez & Richard Pérez-Peña, Fraternity Vows Broader Look Into Use of
Racist Chant, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2015, at A14.
38. See Thomas B. Edsall, No Hate Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/03/13/opinion/hate-politics.html [ https://perma.cc/N5VK-T8ET ],
(analyzing a poll-based study that “found that nearly one out of five Republicans and Democrats agree
with the statement that their political adversaries ‘lack the traits to be considered fully human — they
behave like animals.’”).
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the professor for affirmation and defense, while students who view themselves as
truth-tellers or who aspire to be provocateurs will look for protection of their right
to speak.
Not least because the Law School from its inception has emphasized its
support of public service and commitment to innovation, even students who might
have had little exposure to the legal profession before starting law school have some
expectations about what this law school will offer. UCI Law promises an
“innovative and comprehensive curriculum, and prioritizes public service and a
commitment to diversity within the legal profession,” according to materials on the
Law School’s website.39 Many students in this millennial generation have studied
what behaviors constitute microaggressions40 and have thought about their own
intersectional41 identities; they expect an institution that bills itself as “commit[ed]
to diversity” to be sensitive and supportive.42
This cannot mean, and no student yet has suggested to me that this should
mean, that the class avoids sensitive topics in class. Students often are eager to delve
into the social implications of the caselaw they read, interested in exploring which
groups in society might be consistently advantaged or disadvantaged by the
interpretation of a definition of a crime. Even were it possible to put aside questions
of identity and subordination, many of the judicial opinions assigned in Statutory
Analysis still describe acts of horrific violence. These cases are difficult to read.
Nearly every class session would require a trigger warning, advising students that
difficult material awaits—and in the first days of the semester, I do advise students
of this. I also advise them that I cannot be sure which cases will be more difficult
for individual students to read, because for some, based on personal experiences,
the crime of theft may be especially upsetting, while for others, the facts of a case
of attempted murder may be more disturbing.
The awful facts of the typical cases assigned in a criminal law class pose a
challenge for the instructor. Students may have a hard time analyzing and talking
about the facts of the case for reasons that I do not know. Like each of them, I
must weigh words with care, avoid appearing to take cases lightly. This can be
difficult, especially because repeated exposure to these disturbing facts can inure
one to their impact. A conversation about how to talk about difficult subjects, from
the facts of homicide cases to the role of race in sentencing of defendants to the
death penalty, is an important part of our early discussions in Statutory Analysis. In
the first weeks, when we are still exploring the cases involving interpretation of
39. We Are UCI Law, U.C. IRVINE SCH. L., https://www.law.uci.edu/about/ [ https://
perma.cc/VE6N-6XB7 ] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019 ).
40. See Tanzina Vega, Students See Many Slights as Racial ‘Microaggressions,’ N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 2014, at A1.
41. See Dan Levin, Generation Z: Who They Are, in Their Own Words, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/28/us/gen-z-in-their-words.html [ https://perma.cc/
H34N-V9TF ] (describing characteristics of “Generation Z,” a “postmillennial group of Americans for
whom words like ‘intersectionality’ feel as natural as applying filters to photos on Instagram”).
42. We Are UCI Law, supra note 39.
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statutory language rather than the later cases involving crimes of extreme violence,
I remind students to be thoughtful about their words and also to feel free to speak
with me individually if they have concerns about particular topics on the syllabus.
Teaching this dynamic, thoughtful, diverse, and ever-changing group of
students is a constant challenge. Every year, interactions over the course of the
semester prompt me to rethink how Statutory Analysis is organized and taught. In
this respect, too, the class is a microcosm of the larger law school, requiring constant
re-balancing to achieve different goals. These goals extend beyond the substance of
basic criminal law and statutory construction to encompass effective teaching to
reach all students.
III. A PUBLICLY INTERESTED LAW SCHOOL’S LOOMING CHALLENGE: TUITION,
AID, FORGIVENESS
This Part continues to expand the scope of discussion to encompass a
tremendous challenge facing our increasingly diverse students: paying for their legal
education. The issue is not new, nor is it unique to this law school. The paragraphs
that follow first address criticism of the financial model implemented by this law
school, then turn to concerns over the cost of obtaining a law degree generally.
When the Law School opened its doors in the depths of the Great Recession,
a few commentators on legal education were quick to criticize not its mission but
its price. Brian Tamanaha took the Law School to task in his book, Failing Law
Schools, warning that high tuition would mean high student debt loads, which would
direct students not into public interest careers but into corporate law. Professor
Tamanaha lamented, “Where [UCI Law] went wrong was in setting out to create an
elite law school.”43 In his view, “This goal condemned the project. Affordability and
elite status are mutually exclusive under current circumstances.”44 Charging lower
tuition, offering students only need-based financial aid, requiring faculty to teach
more courses each year, and paying them less would have enabled students to
graduate carrying less debt and consequently more financially able to pursue
whatever career path they liked, Professor Tamanaha wrote.45 The path that the
Law School pursued was, he contended, in “economic terms . . . nothing new.”46
This would have been a very different law school, had Professor Tamanaha’s
vision been implemented, and our founding dean penned a strong defense of the
decision not to pursue that competing vision.47 UCI Law committed itself to public
service and to making public service careers possible for students while also
spending the money needed to achieve elite status, the goals that Professor
43. TAMANAHA, supra note 9, at 182–83.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Erwin Chemerinsky, A Response to Brian Tamanaha, BALKIN (Aug. 28, 2012), https://
balkin.blogspot.com/2012/08/a-response-to-brian-tamanaha.html [ https://perma.cc/YP72UPMC ].
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Tamanaha derided as “mutually exclusive.” But the level of activity of members of
the faculty who serve as public intellectuals speaking out for social justice,48 the level
of activity of our students who log impressive numbers of hours working pro bono
over their three-year sojourns here,49 and the accolades bestowed on the institution
all suggest that our balancing act works.50
The Law School has taken its place among the ranks of elite institutions. This
is no small achievement. As for students’ postgraduate choices, annual data on the
Law School’s graduates suggests that the majority begin their legal careers at law
firms, but nearly 12% go to clerkships, another 13% take public interest jobs, and
12% land in government.51 Time will tell whether these shares will shift as the class
profile changes, with more students choosing to enroll at UCI Law because of its
ranking and regardless of its public interest emphasis. Time will also tell whether
students who begin their careers in law firms move in different directions over time,
as they gain experience and shed their debt.
Impressive career outcomes do not alone address Professor Tamanaha’s
criticism of high tuition—though lofty pricing is a crime of which most law schools
are guilty and which any single institution would be hard-pressed to avoid
committing. Whether graduates choose corporate practice under the pressure of
debt may be tough to say; the numbers do not reveal motivation. But it is difficult

48. There are too many examples of this to cite. As of this writing, one of my colleagues has
addressed Congress on the subject of student indebtedness, Oversight of Bankruptcy Law and Legislative
Proposals: Hearing Before H. Judiciary Subcomm. On Antitrust, Commercial, and Admin. Law (2019),
https://www.law.uci.edu/news/in-the-news/2019/Jimenez-testimony.pdf [ https://perma.cc/
YBC6-P92D] (statement of Dalié Jiménez, Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of
Law); another has been quoted on the horrible practice of shackling of pregnant women in custody,
Ashley Southall, She Was Forced to Give Birth in Handcuffs. Now Her Case Is Changing Police Rules.,
N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/03/nyregion/nypd-pregnant-womenhandcuffs.html [ https://perma.cc/27CG-F742 ]; while another who is one of, if not the, nation’s
expert on election law has spoken out against the Supreme Court’s abdication of federal authority to
rein in gerrymandering, Richard L. Hasen, The Gerrymandering Decision Drags the Supreme Court Further
Into the Mud, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/opinion/
gerrymandering-rucho-supreme-court.html [ https://perma.cc/E4VR-PDRV ].
49. Enriching Our Community, U.C. IRVINE SCH. L., https://www.law.uci.edu/about/publicservice/public-interest/public-service-overview.html [ https://perma.cc/H3GW-JEB2 ] (last visited
Sept. 26, 2019 ) (noting that “[d]uring the 2017–18 academic year, students provided more than 9,000
hours of pro bono service,” and “[m]ore than 90 percent of UCI Law students participate in pro bono
work.”).
50. See, e.g., Accolades, U.C. IRVINE SCH. L., https://www.law.uci.edu/about/accolades/
[ https://perma.cc/HV3N-W32P ] ( last visited Sept. 26, 2019 ).
51. U.C. IRVINE SCH. OF LAW, EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY FOR 2017 GRADUATES, https://
www.law.uci.edu/careers/student/employment-info/statistics/employment-summary-2017.html
[ https://perma.cc/Q4NP-KKRK ] ( last visited Nov. 5, 2019 ). By way of comparison, UCLA School
of Law reported that for the class of 2018, slightly more than five percent of graduates went to
clerkships, about nine percent went into public interest jobs, and slightly more than seven percent went
to work in government. UCLA SCH. L., EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY FOR 2018 GRADUATES, https://
law.ucla.edu/~/media/Assets/Careers/Documents/Employment%20Statistics/Class_of_2018_
ABA_Employment_Summary_040519.ashx [ https://perma.cc/Q8KP-XWBX ] ( last visited Oct. 27,
2019 ).
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to argue that student loans do not affect students career plans, especially loans of
the magnitude that law graduates often have. The most comprehensive study to date
on lawyers’ earning potential suggests that law school remains a very wise
investment from a financial perspective,52 but another study also finds that the
prospect of debt does affect law students’ career choices.53
Throughout the legal academy, cost is a sensitive topic. Members of the faculty
of the Law School are well-compensated and tuition is an important source of
revenue enabling that compensation.54 Competitive salaries were one of the reasons
that the Law School was able to establish itself so quickly as a prestigious institution,
because such salaries made up for the risk that established, successful professors
took in joining a startup. Another reason was the fact that the remarkable legal
education offered here was free for the first class of students and half-price for the
second. Now, however, students are paying market rates, on paper reaching nearly
$50,000 in tuition and assorted fees.55 The other law schools in the University of
California system charge comparable prices.56 All of them also provide financial aid,
of course—much of it on the basis of grades and LSAT scores, which affect each
institution’s placement in various publications’ rankings of academic excellence.
Elsewhere I’ve been critical of such so-called merit aid, 57 which can result in
awards of precious financial support to students who do not need it and greater
debt burdens for those who do.58 This is a collective action problem for law

52. See Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree, 43 J. LEGAL
STUD. 249, 249 (2014) (finding that over a lifetime, a law degree is worth about $1 million).
53. Erica Field, Educational Debt Burden and Career Choice: Evidence from a Financial Aid
Experiment at NYU Law School, 1 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 1, 17 (2009) (finding that
“psychological responses to debt can have a large influence on high stakes decisions” about career
choice).
54. Law faculty like to argue that they could have made considerably larger amounts in private
practice and this is likely the case for many of us. Yet at risk of alienating fellow law professors, I note
that we also chose not to pursue private practice, suggesting that other, intangible forms of compensation
– the chance to engage with students and with scholars – also matter. Law schools are not competing
with elite law firms for faculty.
55. And excluding room and board costs. See School of Law Fees 2018-19, U.C. IRVINE
SCH. L., (August 10, 2018), http://www.reg.uci.edu/fees/2018-2019/law.html [ https://perma.cc/
K9AH-LNZN ].
56. See, e.g., Tuition and Fees, UCLA SCH. L., https://law.ucla.edu/admissions/tuition-fees
[ https://perma.cc/UCG8-HP4T ] (2019–20 tuition and insurance totaling $52,308) ( last visited
Sept. 26, 2019 ).
57. Jonathan D. Glater, To the Rich Go the Spoils: Merit, Money, and Access to Higher Education,
43 J. C. & U. L. 195, 206–07 (2017) (criticizing increasing use of non-need-based financial aid because
“students from higher-income families disproportionately earn higher grades and perform better on
standardized tests, using such measures of academic performance almost certainly diverts aid dollars
from students with financial need and/or students who have historically been underrepresented or
excluded outright from colleges and universities”).
58. See AARON N. TAYLOR ET AL., LAW SCHOOL SCHOLARSHIP POLICIES: ENGINES OF
INEQUITY 12 (2017), http://lssse.indiana.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/LSSSE-2016-AnnualReport.pdf [ https://perma.cc/TJQ7-Q8GS ] (reporting that students “expecting higher law school
debts were less likely to have receive[d] merit scholarships”).
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schools,59 because few institutions are prepared to risk losing high-scoring students
critical to competitive placement in rankings, in order to allocate financial aid
differently. It would be one thing for all University of California law schools to cease
offering merit aid, for example, and another, riskier thing for any one of them alone
to take such a step. In the absence of a broader effort to address the pernicious
effects of non-need-based aid, it is unreasonable to expect individual law schools to
tilt at the rankings windmill.
Which is not to say that there are not steps that should be taken to respond to
concern about law student indebtedness. After all, if the cost of going to law school
increases at the same pace as the cost of going to college, between 3% and 4% at
public institutions,60 then in twenty years, each year of law school will cost more
than $100,000. Such a price tag, unmitigated, will materially affect who chooses to
pursue legal education and more tightly constrain the postgraduate decisions of
indebted graduates. The cost to law schools of cushioning the blow with financial
aid will continue to increase, but the incentive to use aid to bolster the academic
profile of the entering class will not abate on its own. Thus, a looming crisis for law
schools committed to promoting students’ interest in public service careers will be
making such choices financially possible. This challenge confronts all law schools,
not just UCI Law.
For now, the federal Public Service Loan Forgiveness61 program still holds out
the promise that student borrowers who work in public service will have their
federal student loans wiped out after ten years. But the Trump Administration has
indicated its interest in ending this benefit and critics have pointed to the financial
impact that this debt forgiveness could have, depending on how many students
choose to take advantage of it; the two types of attack make the survival of the
program uncertain. Fortunately, this is an area where law schools can act on their
own, notwithstanding the imperative of buying high scores with non-need-based
aid, in the form of institutional loan forgiveness: instead of providing grant aid in
the form of scholarships to students upon enrollment, institutions can offer
repayment assistance ex post, contingent on students’ career choices and wages.
Many schools, especially those with more financial resources, offer such programs.
In the absence of state action to fund loan forgiveness, institutional loan repayment
assistance presents a critical fundraising challenge for law school development
offices. Yet more than offering a wide array of classes, more than addressing
multiple areas of law in the Law School’s clinics, more than hiring particular faculty
members, it is offering loan forgiveness to graduates who pursue public interest
careers that may be the single most important step any law school can take to

59. And for undergraduate institutions, too.
60. COLL. BD., TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2018, at 13 fig. 4A (2018), https://
research.collegeboard.org/pdf/trends-college-pricing-2018-full-report.pdf [ https://perma.cc/9S5P7PKD ].
61. 34 C.F.R. § 685.219.
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demonstrate its commitment to public service and to preserve access to
justice generally.
After all, the consequences of failure to take such steps to cushion the impact
of rising tuition will not only manifest in who chooses to obtain a legal education.
If very few students can afford to work in large swaths of the public sector or in
low-pay, public interest jobs, the cost of law school will further62 limit the number
of lawyers who can afford to take on clients of modest means, let alone those who
are poor and potentially most in need of representation.
Loan repayment assistance programs, or LRAPs, are not a panacea. The
prospect of repayment assistance will not necessarily overcome some potential law
students’ fear of taking on massive debt. As I have noted elsewhere, there is also
evidence that aversion to borrowing is not evenly distributed across the student
population: students from immigrant families, for example, may be particularly
reluctant to borrow.63 Thus debt not only hinders efforts to enable students to
pursue careers in the public interest but may hamper the ability to recruit a class of
students that is racially, ethnically, and socioeconomically diverse. In turn, lack of
diversity among law students inevitably leads to lack of diversity in the legal
profession. In an increasingly pluralistic society, the importance of constructing law
school classes that reflect diverse experiences and perspectives becomes ever more
important. The importance of including members of historically subordinated
groups is especially great in the legal profession, which is singularly concerned with
equity.
It is not surprising that tuition and debt did not figure in the articles written
on the founding of the Law School, perhaps because the first student cohorts
received such generous grant aid.64 As the institution matures and must confront
the same challenges that face other law schools, though, attention to cost and to the
most effective forms of aid matters more. As the cost goes up, it will become ever
more difficult for members of the faculty to recommend that students pursue their
dreams, as the feasibility of doing so declines. With grades assuming yet greater
financial significance, more students who perform poorly in the first year may
choose to avoid additional financial risk and drop out. If they borrowed for that
first year, these students will be in a poor position, indebted and without a credential
that would increase their earning potential. Failure to complete a course of study
has always been a tremendous financial risk, but the downside is greater than ever
because the dollar amounts borrowed are larger than ever.

62. Erica Field, Educational Debt Burden and Career Choice: Evidence from a Financial Aid
Experiment at NYU Law School, 1 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 1, 2–3 (2009) (analyzing a natural
experiment suggesting that even the appearance of increased debt deters students from pursuing public
interest careers).
63. Jonathan D. Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk, 103 CAL. L. REV., 1561, 1590
(2015).
64. See TAMANAHA, supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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To be sure, law schools will continue to discount in the ways discussed above;
more than 90% of this law school’s students receive some amount of financial aid.65
The publicly reported tuition, or sticker price, is not what most students pay, and
the median aid award amounts to a discount of about 50% of that amount.66 The
widespread practice of tuition discounting has its own effects, encouraging students
to haggle with financial aid offices and to pit law schools against each other, as if a
legal education were equivalent to a used car. The commodification of education
generally and of higher education in particular is a pernicious phenomenon yet as
the price rises, it is difficult for the prospective student to think of it in any other
way. A law degree is an investment and the wise investor gets the maximum return
for the smallest outlay; the pressure is really on the outlay because any law school’s
offered return, a J.D., is the same regardless. I have noted elsewhere the prevalence
of this consumer paradigm.67 While it would be naïve to contend that law students
should pursue their professional education in pursuit of learning for its own sake, it
would also be naïve to dismiss concern that they view it purely as a consumer good.
Viewing a law school as only a vendor of a credential debases the educational
experience, likely discourages student engagement with the material taught, and may
produce graduates with a stunted understanding of the lawyer’s role in society.
The current cost structure of legal education puts this law school, and all law
schools, in an awkward position. Accepting the status quo means that students will
continue to be forced to borrow ever-larger amounts in order to finance their legal
education. For all but the wealthiest institutions—which notably have not
responded by cutting their sticker price—extensive, widely available loan
forgiveness is prohibitively expensive. The difficulty of individual institution action
cries out for a broader solution, like Public Service Loan Forgiveness,68 or new,
creative programs with the same goal at the state level. A challenge for the Law
School is undertaking advocacy for greater public support of accessibility of legal
education, at a time that progressive politicians have widely embraced the same goal
with respect to undergraduate education.69

65. U.C. IRVINE SCH. OF LAW, STANDARD 509 INFORMATION REPORT (2018), https://
www.law.uci.edu/about/consumer-info/Std509Report.pdf [ https://perma.cc/NKL3-97G7 ] (Grants
and Scholarships 2017–18).
66. See U.C. IRVINE SCH. OF LAW, STANDARD 509 INFORMATION REPORT (2018), https://
www.law.uci.edu/about/consumer-info/Std509Report.pdf [ https://perma.cc/VDY2-JHC9 ].
67. See Jonathan D. Glater, The Narrative and Rhetoric of Student Debt, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 885,
887 (2018) (recognizing and endorsing the criticism that “too many students pursue education for the
wrong reasons, seeking lucre rather than learning”).
68. Although this program has been plagued with problems and many graduates who thought
themselves eligible have sued after encountering difficulty taking advantage of its benefits. Ron Lieber,
3 Borrowers Win Case on Eligibility for Public Service Loan Forgiveness, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2019,
at A21.
69. See Andrew Kreighbaum, Free College Goes Mainstream, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Sep. 26,
2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/09/26/growing-number-democrats-run-freecollege-pushing-issue-mainstream [ https://perma.cc/FKB7-62H2 ].

First to Printer_Glater (Do Not Delete)

2020]

STATUTORY ANALYSIS

1/17/2020 10:33 AM

423

Taking on such a role likely requires a change in mindset of the leadership of
many universities, who for years before the law school downturn70 learned to expect
legal education to serve as a cash cows for their campuses and no doubt hope that
those halcyon days will soon return. With applications up in fall 2017 and fall 2018,
those expectations may be met, but given the longer-term problem of rising costs,
complacency would amount to complicity. Law schools and the education they
provide should be recognized as a public, as well as private, good, because their
graduates perform a crucial role in a society governed by law. Law schools
consequently may be worthy of subsidy as are other fields of study, like literature
or philosophy, that a university maintains not only because they generate revenue
but because they are critical to a liberal curriculum. For this law school, which was
protected by the University of California, Irvine from the law school downturn,
endorsing this vision of legal education may be easier.
This law school has also assumed a more active role already, thanks to an
innovative relationship with an organization led by the former student loan
ombudsman at the federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in
Washington, D.C., dedicated to the study of student borrowing and advocacy to
address education debt as a societal problem. In the fall, the Law School partnered
with the new Student Borrower Protection Center, the nonprofit organization
founded by former regulators at the CFPB, to create the Student Loan Law Initiative
(the “Initiative”).71 The Initiative is committed to the study of the effects of student
borrowing and to informing advocacy for changes in policy to reduce the adverse
impact of debt. Through the Consumer Law Clinic at the Law School, the Initiative
will also help individual borrowers and familiarize students, many of whom may
themselves be student borrowers, with the complex legal framework around student
debt.
The Initiative was not publicized as an effort to help law students, today or in
the future, but it could have been. Research on education debt and the advocacy
informed by that research will benefit students. Prioritizing higher education
finance is also a political issue, because if student debt is a problem and the price of
law school (and college) continues to rise as it has for many decades, then the only
long-term solution is reallocation of that cost away from students and families and
back to state and federal governments. This is not wild-eyed idealism: through the
1970s, federal grant aid covered nearly all the cost of attending a public, four-year
university.72 As federal aid to students languished and state support of higher
70. See Elizabeth Olson & David Segal, A Steep Slide in Law School Enrollments Accelerates,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2014, at B3 (reporting that “[e]nrollment numbers of first-year law students have
sunk to levels not seen since 1973”).
71. U.C. IRVINE, SCH. OF LAW, Press Release: Former CFPB Student Loan Watchdog
Launches New Organization to Protect Student Borrowers (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.law.uci.edu/
news/press-releases/Student-Loan-Law-Initiative.html [ https://perma.cc/W7KJ-H7Z9 ].
72. Glater, supra note 63, at 1577 n.76 (citing to SUZANNE METTLER, DEGREES OF
INEQUALITY: HOW THE POLITICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION SABOTAGED THE AMERICAN DREAM
66–67 (2014)).
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education failed to keep pace with rising prices growing demand, more of the cost
shifted to students and families. At one level this is a success story, because the
availability of federal loans has put higher education within reach. But at another
level it is a cautionary tale, because the sheer magnitude of borrowing harms
indebted students and limits the opportunities that access was intended to enable.
Law schools rely on the availability of student debt and on a population of
students willing to incur it in pursuit of a law degree. As the rising cost and
concurrently rising levels of indebtedness affect who chooses to enroll and what
they choose to do after graduating, it is incumbent on law schools to explore creative
ways to preserve accessibility of the JD degree. I anticipate that this will be a
continuing challenge for the Law School, which is still just one institution among
many, and I hope that others will also participate in efforts to support affordability,
whether through need-based grants upon matriculation or debt forgiveness upon
graduation. Each approach is costly, but the need will only grow.
CONCLUSION
UCI Law began at a time of great uncertainty. This looked like a highly risky
endeavor. That the Law School has done extraordinarily well in its first decade does
not mean we have succeeded or that it will soon succeed; in fact, if we conclude that
we have succeeded, I suspect that we will have started down the road to mediocrity.
Continual reevaluation and a willingness to change have been essential to
institutions that last as the world around them evolves, and will be critical for the
Law School, too. In part this is about what the Law School teaches, in part it is
about how members of the faculty teach, but it is also about the role that the Law
School plays in the lives of our students. As Part III of this Essay outlined, as the
price our students pay to attend the law school continues to increase, we cannot
ignore the implications for them, for the profession, and for the public service ideals
which this institution is pledged to pursue. For now at least, enough students are
willing and able to enroll and there are enough high-paying jobs to enable indebted
graduates to repay their loans and lead highly productive lives. There is no
immediate risk, in other words, that the current economic model of legal education
is unstable. It is that it is quite stable—but will have consequences, for us and for
the legal profession, that we should oppose.
In this Essay I have described Statutory Analysis: Criminal Law, a first-year
course at the law school, and identified the multiple goals that the course seeks to
achieve. I have suggested that this class strikes a balance between two of those goals,
teaching students basic tools of statutory interpretation, on the one hand, and
teaching them basic criminal law concepts and the elements of core crimes, on the
other. I have suggested that this balancing act is akin to that undertaken by this law
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school as a whole, as it delicately navigates between tradition and innovation.73 The
changing composition of the law school’s student body will continue to push the
institution as it develops in its next decade, as each group of aspiring lawyers brings
its own expectations, ambitions, and most importantly, knowledge and experience.
I have every expectation that they will continue to challenge us to be better, as a
faculty and as an institution, for decades to come, just as they have done so far.

73. See generally Bryant G. Garth, Having it Both Ways. The Challenge of Legal Education
Innovation and Reform at UCI and Elsewhere: Against the Grain and/or Aspiring to Be Elite, 10
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 373 (2020).
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